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Abstract 
This paper describes a new process theory model of how trust in a technology changes 
over time. It proposes that trust change occurs after people pay attention to an event, 
make sense of it, and pass a threshold for changing their trust level. We call these the 
cognitive gears of trust. We extend the model with two variance theory factors—
perceived technology risk and loyalty to the technology vendor— which should also 
affect how trust changes over time. Using hierarchical linear modeling we analyze data 
from 1799 respondents who report their trust after seeing eight successive news briefs 
about the technology. We find the effects on trust change of three cognitive processes—
attention, sensemaking, and threshold as well as two factors—tech risk and loyalty. 
Keywords:  Attention, attribution, threshold, trust change, intention to use, process theory, risk, 
and loyalty. 
Introduction 
Trust has been found to be an important psychological construct in Information Systems (IS). Research 
has found trust to be important to acceptance and adoption of various technologies such as e-commerce 
websites and recommendation agents (Gefen et al. 2003a;  McKnight et al. 2002a; Pavlou and Gefen 
2004; Komiak and Benbasat 2008). Significant IS research has been done regarding trust in online and 
technical settings. Some of that research has examined trust over two time frames (e.g., Gefen et al. 
2003b). However, little is known about how trust changes over iterative time periods. There is a lot of  
research about factors influencing trust, but nothing about trust change itself as a dependent variable. 
The difference is crucial, because trust may or may not change over time as people obtain new 
information.  For example, if you hear negative news about your bank being hacked, this may lower your 
trust in it. Before the news, you did not hesitate to access your bank online. But after the news, do you 
trust the bank enough to transfer funds from one of your accounts to another one online? Information 
affecting trust can be provided by experience or by second-hand information, such as from the news 
media. But little is known about the process by which trust changes over time. This study examines how 
trust in a technology changes over eight brief time periods when one is considering using a technology. 
Our research questions are about predicting trust change, not trust itself: How does trust in a technology 
change in response to events over eight brief time periods? By “how,” we mean what cognitive 
mechanisms facilitate trust changes? Besides the cognitive mechanisms, what other factors influence how 
trust changes? We found few studies that have addressed both these questions regarding trust change. 
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These questions are vital to IS research because, for example, e-commerce trust relationships do change. 
Research has shown that trust influences customer loyalty (Flavian et al. 2006). But no one has examined 
how trust changes over multiple time periods, which would affect ongoing consumer loyalty to a vendor. 
Researchers have noted that the process of trust formation and change is a “critical issue” (Mayer et al. 
1995: 730; see also Doney and Cannon 1997; Gefen et al. 2003a; Kanawattanachai and Yoo 2002). “How” 
something changes is crucial to know because combined events and cognitions that cause changes over 
time are often too complex for variance theories to depict (Mitchell and James 2001). Therefore, we 
employ a developmental process-based approach, as used by Sabherwal and Robey (1993, 1995). 
Based on social-psychological theory, this paper introduces a unique information processing model (IPM) 
of how trust changes in response to external events.  By trust we mean a willingness to depend on the 
other party (Mayer et al. 1995). We use trusting intention (Benamati et al. 2010) instead of the more oft-
used trust beliefs (benevolence, competence, integrity—e.g., Gefen et al. 2003a) because willingness to 
depend is more action-oriented than trust beliefs. Willingness to depend indicates one is prepared to 
become vulnerable to the trustee instead of just having positive beliefs towards the trustee. For example, it 
is argued that trusting intention in a Web vendor “puts the consumer at risk in terms of service delivery 
[and] personal information protection...” (McKnight et al. 2004, p. 43). Trusting intention has also been 
found to predict as well as, or better than trust beliefs (Benamati et al. 2010). The paper also contributes 
to IS research because we examine changes of trust in the technology artifact (Orlikowski and Iacono 
2001), not trust in people. 
Theoretical Development 
Process theories differ widely from variance theories. Variance theories stipulate causal relationships 
among variables using a what-leads-to-what logic. Process theories usually specify which temporally-
ordered occurrences are necessary for other occurrences to take place (Komiak and Benbasat 2008; 
Sabherwal and Robey 1993, 1995). In IS research, Markus and Robey (1988) explain that process theories 
specify how phenomena unfold and change over time through necessary but not sufficient conditions.  
For example, Mohr (1982) says the necessary conditions for spreading malaria are the existence of the 
malarial parasite, animals harboring that parasite, and the presence of Anopheles mosquitoes. The 
mechanisms involve hungry mosquitoes who bite infected and the non-infected people/animals. 
Mechanism timing also matters. Although this kind of process theory research is valuable, it is relatively 
scarce in the IS trust literature (Komiak and Benbasat, 2008; Markus and Robey, 1988). We apply this 
process theory approach to trust change. Our theory is informed by Monge’s (1990) framework, which 
identifies two dimensions used to compare processes: frequency and magnitude of change (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Generic Process Model 
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Several trust researchers have considered trust growth or change as a process. Some of these posit stage 
models. For example, based on Lewicki and Bunker (1996), Ba (2001) posits that trust proceeds from a 
calculus-based trust stage to an information-based trust stage and then to a transference-based trust 
stage. To Ba (2001), transference-based trust builds on calculus- and information-based trust. The 
Rempel et al. (1985) stage model says trust progresses through these stages: predictability, then 
dependability, then faith. Attribution is involved the latter two stages.  
Other researchers posit specific trust processes. Doney and Cannon (1997) briefly propose five trust 
building processes (calculative, prediction, capability, intentionality, and transference), but do not offer 
empirical tests. Several IS trust researchers say trust develops through the cognitive process of calculating 
penalties versus rewards. Hence it is termed calculus-based or deterrence-based trust (Ba 2001; 
Jarvenpaa et al. 1999; Tan and Thoen 2000-2001). Gefen et al. (2003a) find variance-theory evidence for 
calculus-based trust. Ba (2001) posits that social norms and community enforcement mechanisms build 
trust through reputation effects. Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998) discuss how in-group categorization can 
take place swiftly in work teams. Similarly, McKnight et al. (1998) explain that unit grouping and 
stereotyping are two social categorization processes that explain high initial trust levels. However, neither 
McKnight nor Jarvenpaa and Leidner test how the social categorization process unfolds. Stewart (2003) 
proposes and tests a transference social cognitive model of trust development. The transfer process works 
by suggesting to a user that the unknown website has characteristics like the known website because they 
are categorized together. Stewart uses variance theory methods to test the model. Komiak and Benbasat 
(2008) catalog from the literature a large number of trust processes and then show through verbal 
protocols that trust building and distrust building occur through different processes. In sum, some trust 
process research exists, but there is room for more integrative and testable trust change process theory. 
Model Overview  
Our IPM model is based on an information process cycle that includes attention, attribution and 
judgment as necessary precursors to any change in trust. In this discussion, the “trustee” is the system or 
technology upon which the “trustor” may or may not be willing to depend. The information processing 
model’s action initiates when an event takes place that may have trust ramifications (Figure 2, Node 1). 
The event may be an interaction with the trustee or some signal about the trustee that comes as parties 
transact or as the trustor garners new second-hand information about the trustee. We obtain information 
from interaction and from other sources, such as Facebook posts about the trustee. Multiple trust-related 
events may occur in a relationship with a vendor. For example, online book buying involves: order 
placing, shipment tracking, book receiving, and dispute resolving.  
The model process proceeds clockwise. The event passes through the perception and memory module, 
which provides a context for either noticing or ignoring the event. Node 2 on Figure 2 (attention gear) 
refers to the extent to which the trusting person pays attention to the event. Attention is important to 
trust (e.g., Kovar et al. 2000). If the event is not noticed (2. “No” path), no subsequent steps are 
completed, trust stays the same, and the event is likely not retained in memory. Attention necessarily 
precedes sensemaking/attribution (Node 3), because “If events are noticed, people make sense of them; 
and if events are not noticed, they are not available for sensemaking” (Louis and Sutton 1991: 58-59). The 
necessity of each node and the way in which a node hands off to, or depends on, other nodes caused us to 
think of them as cognitive gears that may or may not engage the next gear. 
Node 3. involves event sensemaking. Scholars posit that trust is updated through a mental sensemaking 
or attribution process (Luhmann 1979; Rempel et al. 1985) to see if the event contradicts the current trust 
level. After sensemaking, the trustor assesses whether the attributed contradiction is serious enough to 
exceed the threshold cost of updating the trust level (node 4) (Prietula and Carley 2001). If not, the trust 
level is not updated and processing awaits the next event. If so, the update node is initiated, which 
increases / decreases the trust level. The person then brings a new level of trust to the perceptual system 
that encounters the next event. We also assume the memory is updated as gears 2-5 are engaged. Except 
for the thin arrow coming out of Attention, the “No” arrows suggest that the memory is updated after a 
gear even when that gear does not engage the next gear. Even though for simplicity we have labeled the 
arrows “Yes” or “No,” we recognize each arrow will reflect some degree of (dis)/agreement with its 
question rather than a black-and-white “Yes” or “No.” For example, the arrows coming out of the 
attention node reflect the degree to which one pays attention to the event, not just whether or not (yes or 
no) one pays attention. We now explain the model in more detail.   
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Figure 2. Trust Development -- An Information Processing Model (IPM) 
The Attention Gear 
By attention, we first mean the process of a person expending cognitive effort on the event instead of 
ignoring it. Figure 2 depicts attention as this process. Second, we translate the process concept of 
attention into a measurable outcome concept to measure the perceptual result of the attention gear. Van 
de Ven and Poole (1990) suggest this type of variance theory data and other qualitative process data may 
be gathered in process studies. This outcome concept would act as an indicator of the process taking 
place. So here we define attention as the extent to which one examines an event carefully. The opposite of 
attention is ignoring or not noticing an event. Cohen et al. (1972) point out that people do not attend to 
everything that happens around them. Bounded rationality underlies the process. The mind only 
consciously processes a small percentage of the stimuli it encounters (Lopes 1982). Only certain events 
engage people cognitively. For example, many of us can recall exactly what we were doing when the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks occurred, indicating that we paid a lot of attention to that event. As a 
more mundane example, Kovar et al. (2000) found that only 56% of study participants noticed a well-
placed WEBTRUST seal on a website.  Further, people often ignore information that does not match what 
they believe, because the memory of past events interacts with what is perceived (Norman 1969). Hence 
an event must pass through the trustor’s perceptual / memory module before they pay attention to it. 
Scholars say that monitoring attention toward a system or person increases or decreases under certain 
conditions (Muir, 1994, Walther, 1995).  
The fact that people pay little attention to most events limits the opportunity for trust change. That is 
because a trust change due to an event is much less likely to occur if the trustor does not notice the event. 
Thus Figure 2 depicts attention as a necessary mental process that occurs before a trust change takes 
place. Although attention is necessary, it is not sufficient to change trust. Instead, the trustor must also 
engage the sensemaking and judgment gears (Luhmann 1979). But attention increases the potential for 
trust change. We suggest that attention is the first condition necessary for trust change. This is how Mohr  
(1982) suggests developmental processes should be depicted. That is, trustor attention to a behavioral 
event is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the change in a trustor’s level of trust. This implies 
that greater attention will produce more trust change. Stated in terms of Monge’s (Figure 1) generic 
process picture, this means the outcome of attention will relate positively to trust change frequency and 
magnitude. 
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Hypothesis 1: The higher the attention level is, the higher the magnitude and frequency of trust change 
will be. 
The Sensemaking/Attribution Gear 
Several scholars have studied trust-related attributions. In Rempel et al. (1985), dependability beliefs 
form based on an attribution process in which the trustee is assessed. Wang and Benbasat (2008) studied 
trust attributions regarding B2C recommendation agents. One ascribes underlying qualities or enduring 
motivations to the other based on observable evidence (Prietula and Carley 2001). For example, one who 
sees a 3rd party seal on a Web site may assess whether it implies one can increase trust the site. In 
general, “…attributions appear to be centrally involved in the process of drawing inferences about others’ 
(O’s) motives, intentions, and dispositions” (Kramer 1996: 219). For example, when we attribute a 
negative event to another’s motives, this may lead us to change our beliefs about them.  
Attribution has several different meanings. But it generally equates with sensemaking, which is a mental 
process in which one draws conclusions from an event (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). Sensemaking is the 
process depicted in Figure 2. But we also define a related outcome concept (or indicator) so it can be 
easily measured when sensemaking has taken place. We conceptually define the term sensemaking to 
mean the outcome of this mental process. That is, when a person has made sense of an event via 
attribution, sensemaking is the extent to which the perceived outcome of this mental process seems 
inconsistent with their current trust such that they may need to re-evaluate that trust (Holmes 1991). That 
is, we equate “attribution” with the perceptual outcome of the trust-related event “sensemaking” process. 
Attribution is a very subjective, individual process. Assuming bounded rationality, “… individuals … may 
intend to act rationally, [but] can do so only in a limited fashion” (Weick 1979: 20, 8). Hence, much 
noticed information is never fully or rationally appraised. Because attributions are subjective, their 
outcomes are difficult to predict. Scientists have found social attribution to be unpredictable and often 
irrational (Fiske and Taylor 1991). A specific attribution episode may or may not change trust. 
Only when the cause of an event is decided can trust change be considered, and only when the event’s 
sensemaking unambiguously contradicts one’s existing trust perceptions is a trust update very likely. A 
trustor must perceive a clear contradiction between the existing trust level and event-implied 
trustworthiness before deciding to update trust. Since many of O’s actions may be interpreted 
ambiguously instead of providing clear evidence against one’s trust levels, relatively few events will be 
attributed in a way that proposes a change in trust. When sensemaking suggests one’s trust level has been 
contradicted, then sensemaking may result in a trust change.  
But as important as it is, sensemaking does not completely encompass the trust change process. Before 
sensemaking, a person must attend to the event. Even after a trust-contradicting sensemaking takes place, 
a threshold judgment must occur before trust changes. Hence, sensemaking is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to change trust. This implies, however, that the more sensemaking contradicts the 
existing trust level, the more likely trust will change. In terms of the Monge model:  
Hypothesis 2: The higher the sensemaking level is, the higher the magnitude and frequency of the trust 
change will be. 
Note that we have not specified sufficient conditions for trust change. This is typical for process theories 
(Mohr 1982). Process theories set up the necessary conditions and provide some assumptions to guide 
what makes change more or less likely. But they tend to assume non-deterministic and probabilistic 
mechanisms that may or may not result in the change. Conditions in the highly complex real world of 
humans and organizations make these assumptions true to life. Thus, the sufficient conditions for change 
are not specified. For example, the garbage can model of organizational change assumes “…a relatively 
complicated interplay among the generation of problems in an organization, the deployment of personnel, 
the production of solutions, and the opportunities for choice.” (Cohen et al., 1972: 2)  
The Threshold Gear 
After sensemaking, a trustor judges whether a threshold is met for revising trust levels.  This is termed a 
judgment gear because it compares the reasons or benefits for updating trust with the costs of updating 
trust. Judgment is defined as the process of making a size comparison between two things (Smith et al. 
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1991). With trust change decisions, the things compared are the perceived costs and benefits of a trust 
change. Changing trust level is cognitively expensive because trust is a central, highly connected 
relationship concept (Berscheid 1994). If one alters trust, one has to change a number of other beliefs, 
such as liking and respect of O. It costs less cognitively to maintain one’s existing beliefs and to consider 
the event an anomaly or quirk.  
Few researchers have discussed the idea that trust change involves thresholds. Holmes (1991: 84) says 
those with low trust arrived there after an accumulation of trust violations that exceeded “thresholds of 
tolerance.” Prietula and Carley (2001) suggest that emotion impacts trust when affective responses exceed 
thresholds. Luhmann (1979) explains that trust is not threatened by every event.  Rather, "The object of 
trust enjoys a certain credit which allows even unfavorable experiences to be effectively reinterpreted or 
absorbed...control is exercised by means of thresholds which may not be crossed without the withdrawal 
of trust” (1979: 29). This statement indicates that passing a threshold is a necessary condition for 
decreasing one’s trust level. But little is known empirically about how trust thresholds work. 
We posit, based on calculative trust theory (Gefen et al., 2003a; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996), that the 
threshold for willingness to change trust is met when the perceived benefits of changing trust significantly 
exceed the perceived costs of changing trust. Thus, in the judgment gear, trustors compare perceived costs 
against perceived benefits to see if a change in trust is warranted. As with sensemaking, this is a subjective 
process. Trust will usually not change unless benefits exceed costs because the trustor will prefer to 
maintain the status quo rather than undertake an expensive reconfiguration of perceptions about O. In 
the case of trust potentially decreasing, perceived costs not only include reconfiguration but also the risk 
of ruining the relationship, perhaps jeopardizing the venture. Another cost is reinterpreting past emotions 
in light of the new level of trust. Recasting occurs after trust changes (Luhmann, 1979). The need for 
benefits to exceed costs forms a threshold that reduces the likelihood of trust change. Hence, a threshold 
for changing trust is a necessary condition for the change in a trustor’s level of trust.  While Figure 2 
depicts the change from one’s current trust level as a yes-no proposition, we believe trust change will 
likely be a matter of degree.  
Though it may be possible, it would be very difficult to observe and measure the cognitive process of a 
trust threshold judgment taking place. Hence, we define an indicator that the threshold process has taken 
place and that the trustor is ready to change their trust level. As with attention and sensemaking, this is an 
outcome concept. We define it in terms of how well the threshold for trust change has been met and call 
the concept “threshold-met.” We define the threshold-met concept as the extent to which one intends or is 
ready to change one’s trust. Just because one intends to change trust does not mean one will actually 
change trust. Many TAM studies have found this with the intention to use and use concepts (e.g., Davis et 
al. 1989). With behavioral intention to use a system, merely having an intention to use it does not mean 
one will actually use it. But it does increase the probability that one will use it. The more one expresses an 
intention to use the system, the more one will actually use it. So with our threshold indicator. To the 
extent that a trustor expresses an intention to change trust, she is likely in actuality to make that change.  
Hypothesis 3: The higher the threshold-met level is, the higher the magnitude and frequency of the 
actual trust change will be. 
While we know a bit about trust progression, the IPM depicts trust progressing in a subjective and less 
than rational manner. Thus, trust change will be difficult to accurately predict (Holmes 1991; Kramer 
1996). Each of three sequential, probabilistic, inter-related process mechanisms (attention, attribution, 
and threshold judgment) must operate consecutively in order for trust to change. Not only is the engaging 
of each process gear a question mark, but each has an indeterminate outcome, making trust change very 
tough to predict.  But certain factors may increase the likelihood of trust change. We now propose two:  
risk and loyalty. These variance factors may increase trust change. Variance factors can enrich process 
theory. The likelihood that process mechanisms change a DV may be altered by individual-level variables. 
Two Model Extensions—Risk and Loyalty 
Risk. Perceived situational risk is important to trust attention and attribution. Indeed, risk is what makes 
trust an important variable (Zand 1972), because with no risk, no need for trust exists. Situational risk 
means the likelihood that negative consequences will occur in the context. The higher the perceived 
situational risk, the more one will feel compelled to attend to an event and make sense of it, as Kramer 
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(1996) found. When one attends to and makes sense of an event, trust is more likely to change. Low risk 
situations do not get one’s attention like high risk ones do. Both attention and sensemaking take mental 
energy that will not be expended unless one thinks the risk justifies it. Thus, low risk situations will 
produce less effortful sensemaking. If situational risk positively influences attention and sensemaking, it 
should also increase trust change, since attention and sensemaking positively influence trust change, as 
argued above for Hypotheses 1 & 2. 
Hypothesis 4: Higher perceived technology risk will significantly increase the magnitude and frequency 
of trust change regarding the technology. 
Loyalty. In loyal close personal relationships people idealize their partner and use that idealized 
perception to dispel or ignore the effects of negative events (Holmes 1991; Murray and Holmes 1997). The 
same may occur in other relationships. For example, one who is highly loyal to Apple Corporation may 
disregard or explain away negative news about an Apple product, leaving trust unchanged. This effect is 
somewhat illusionary in that one is more optimistic about their partner’s traits than is always rationally 
merited given the evidence. But illusionary thinking can solidify a relationship or business partnership.  
Hypothesis 5: People with high technology vendor loyalty will experience trust changes that are lower in 
magnitude and frequency than will people with low technology vendor loyalty. 
We wanted to be able to compare how trust changes over time with how some other construct changes 
over time to see to what extent the cognitive processes (e.g., attention, sensemaking) employed are 
similar. For this purpose we chose to study behavioral intention to use the technology. We believe it likely 
that the same processes and factors that influence trust change will also affect intention to use. This is 
because both constructs affect decisions about technology use. Further, trust and intention to use will 
probably correlate highly over time, especially when a person has little or no experience with a technology. 
This is because if one is willing to depend on the new technology, it follows logically that one is much 
more likely to intend to use the technology. For example, McKnight et al. (2002b) found willingness to 
depend (trust) was a good predictor of willingness to purchase online. Presumably, the same kinds of 
cognitive processing take place when one decides whether or not to use a technology as it does when 
deciding to trust it. So attention, sensemaking, and threshold will likely affect intention to use. 
Hypothesis 6: The higher the attention, sensemaking, and threshold levels are, the higher the 
magnitude and frequency of change in intention to use will be. 
Methodology  
We designed an online Qualtrics survey that allows us to test the hypotheses. The survey is anonymous 
and collects the trust each respondent has in one technology product. On average, it took 20 minutes to 
complete the survey. Survey participants are students (average age = 22; 64% male) volunteering to 
participate. They were recruited from information systems and business courses at four comprehensive 
North American universities mainly through course extra credit (0.8% to 1% of course credit); at one 
school students did the survey during class time. The response rate was 85% for a final sample of 1799.  
Participants first sign the consent form and answer demographic and control questions. Vendor loyalty is 
also measured. They are then assigned randomly to give their opinions about one of five different 
technologies: a TomTom GPS, the Google driverless car, Ford's SYNC in-car voice communication system, 
the Apple Siri feature, and Facebook. After reading a brief Wikipedia excerpt about the technology, they 
are asked their initial impressions of it (e.g., technology risk, trust, and intention to use) and are then 
shown a series of eight news briefs about that technology (four positive and four negative) and, after each, 
report their attention, sensemaking, threshold, trust in the technology, and intention to use it. The news 
briefs were selected from a recent months’ Nexis newspaper articles and were shortened to make them 
easier to read. Articles typically discuss the technology’s features or experiences with it. Each respondent 
saw the same eight news briefs on that technology. After the last news brief segment, they answer a few 
post test items giving their final opinions about the technology. We also equalized news brief 
positivity/negativity across technologies. We had a separate group of students rate a larger set of news 
briefs on a 7-point scale from Strongly Negative (1) to Strongly Positive (7). We selected news briefs used 
for a technology such that: a) four were positive and four were negative; b) the group of news briefs did 
not significantly differ in average negativity/positively from 4.0 and from that of other technologies. That 
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is, the positive news briefs completely balanced out the negative news briefs. The order of news brief 
presentation was done in eight alternating pos/negative patterns nested within the technology treatments 
[ + - + - + - + - ], [ - + - + - + - + ], [ + + - - + + - - ], [ - - + + - - + + ], [+ + + + - - - - ], [ - - - - + + + + ], [ + 
+ - - - - + + ], [ + + - + + - - - ]. The 1st pattern became a reference group in the analyses. 
In the survey, we collect data on six key model variables: attention, sensemaking, threshold-met, trust in, 
and risk perceptions towards, the technology, and loyalty to the technology vendor. Questions on the first 
four were answered after they read each news brief. Due to survey length with eight iterations, we had to 
use 1-item scales, but only after a pilot test showed they were a part of validated multi-item scales. We 
tested construct validity for all multi-item constructs, including control variables (listed below). The 
lowest Cronbach’s alpha was for risk propensity (0.69); the other alphas exceeded 0.77. All item loadings 
(using direct oblimin) exceeded 0.65 and all cross-loadings were below 0.16. We tested discriminant 
validity by seeing if any correlations exceeded the square roots of their AVEs. None did. Next we selected 
the item we felt best represented each construct, examining both item-to-construct loadings and how well 
each item reflected the construct’s core meaning. We used 7-point scales except for trust, which had an 11-
point scale to try to capture more finite changes. To measure attention to a news brief, we ask whether 
they would ignore this news brief or pay attention to it. Choice options range from “I would definitely 
ignore it” to “I would definitely pay attention to it.” Next, we ask the respondents “to what extent does this 
news brief influence you to reconsider how much you trust this technology product?” This wording 
reflects a thorough sensemaking that might lead to trust change. Choice options go from “Not at all” to “A 
huge amount.” The threshold measure indicates an intention to change trust: “I am now going to change 
my level of trust in [technology].” (Scale: Definitely Not Change Trust to Definitely Change Trust). We ask 
the respondents for their risk feelings: “How would you characterize the decision of whether to use this 
technology product?” Choice options are “significant opportunity” to “significant risk.” Trust is measured 
by: “For doing [actions that employ the technology], I feel I can depend on this technology product.” This 
wording is central to trust because it indicates a willingness to depend (i.e., be vulnerable—Mayer et al. 
1995). Scaling was from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Intention to use was: “If given the 
opportunity, I would use (or continue to use) [it].” 
Results  
Some descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows that respondents have little 
experience with most of the technologies in the study, which means this study mainly deals with changes 
in initial trust in a technology. The exception is Facebook, a technology most of the subjects have used for 
years. Table 2 shows the overall change that took place in several key variables over the nine time periods 
of the study (Time 0 to Time 8). We found the mean attention level to be 4.8/7.0, the sensemaking mean 
to be 3.6/7.0 and the threshold mean 3.6/7.0. Because the scale anchors on these constructs differ widely, 
these figures cannot be compared. Over the nine time periods, the average trust level decreased from 6.85 
to 6.15 (-10.2%--see Table 2). Intent to use each technology also decreased. These findings are striking, 
since the positivity/negativity was balanced. This shows the negative events had a greater overall effect 
than the positive events. Another striking finding is how much trust decreases differed by technology. 
Trust decreased very little for Apple Siri (-1.8%), Google driverless car (-3.1%) and Facebook (-4.4%), 
whereas trust decreased much more for Ford SYNC (-12.2%) and TomTom GPS (-26.9%). This difference 
occurred despite event positivity/negativity balance across technologies. Table 2 also shows that even 
though trust decreased for all five technologies, loyalty to the technology vendor only decreased for 
Google. Vendor loyalty increased for the other technologies, and the highest percentage increase in loyalty 
was for TomTom (11.9%), which started with the lowest loyalty (2.8/7.0). 
 
Table 1.  Respondent Experience with their assigned Technology 
 Average Across 
Technologies 
Apple 
Siri 
Google 
Car 
TomTo
m GPS 
Ford 
Sync 
Face 
book 
Time Length of Use (1) 2.31 1.94 1.15 1.75 1.38 5.58 
Time length of use is measured on 1-7 pt. scale.  1: Have not used at all; 2: < 1 year; 3: 1-2 
years; 4: >2 but <3 years; 5: >3 but <4 years; 6: >4 but <5 years;  7: > 5 years   
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Of course, not every respondent’s trust level went down; only 44.2% of respondents lowered their trust 
from T0 to T8 (Table 3). Table 3 shows that 29.1% of subjects’ trust levels did not change at all, and 
another 26.7% went up. The average trust change magnitude over 8 periods was -1.06. Table 4 shows the 
frequency of the event-level absolute value of trust change. After 52.7% of the events, trust did not change. 
For events that changed trust, the cognitive gears had significantly higher averages than for events that 
did not change trust (attention: 5.1 vs. 4.4; sensemaking: 4.2 vs. 3.1; threshold: 4.1 vs. 3.2; all p<.001). 
The magnitude of change tests we perform later will examine the absolute values of trust change.  
 
 
Given the multilevel nature of the hypotheses and data, we used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) for 
the analysis (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). Our data exists at two levels:  the event (lower) level 
(attention, sensemaking, threshold, trust, intention to use) and the respondent (higher) level (perceived 
risk of technology, vendor loyalty, and the control variables). We have 1799 respondents total, and 
measure each respondent’s event level variables after they read each of the 8 different news briefs. In our 
case, HLM allows one to see the effects on trust change of both the iterative news brief event (lower) level 
variables (e.g., attention) and the respondent (higher) level variables (e.g., loyalty). A significant portion 
(at least 10-15%) of higher/respondent level variance is a prerequisite for running HLM models (Hofmann 
1997). So we analyzed this before proceeding. The intraclass correlation (ICC) of 33.6% (for trust change 
magnitude) and 26.5% (for BI change magnitude) indicate the use of HLM is appropriate and necessary 
for correct analysis of our sample. 
Table 2.  Variable Means and T0-T8 Changes  
 Average Apple Siri Google  Car TomTom GPS Ford SYNC Facebook 
Trust T0  6.85 6.85 5.78 7.43 6.88 7.33 
Trust T8 6.15 6.73 5.6 5.43 6.04 7.01 
%Change -10.2% -1.8% -3.1% -26.9% -12.2% -4.4% 
Intent to Use T0 4.9 4.57 4.90 4.71 5.01 5.32 
Intent to Use T8 4.42 4.51 4.56 3.69 4.40 4.96 
%Change -9.8% -1.3% -6.9% -21.7% -12.2% -6.8% 
Risk of Tech T0 3.41 3.22 3.93 3.17 3.24 3.49 
Risk of Tech T8 3.90 3.54 4.38 4.05 3.87 3.64 
%Change 14.4% 9.9% 11.5% 27.8% 19.4% 4.3% 
Loyalty to Vendor T0 3.59 3.77 4.74 2.78 2.88 3.76 
Loyalty to Vendor T8 3.76 3.93 4.52 3.11 3.14 4.14 
%Change 4.7% 4.2% -4.6% 11.9% 9.0% 10.1% 
Note: Trust is measured on 1-10 scale; others on 1-7 scale   
Table 3.  Subject-Level Trust Change Incidence from Time 0 to Time 8 
Trust Change -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 
# Changing 6 8 22 15 44 88 74 130 175 233 523 
% of Total 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.8 2.4 4.9 4.1 7.2 9.7 13 29.1 
Cum.% of Tot. 0.3 0.8 2 2.8 5.3 10.2 14.3 21.5 31.2 44.2 73.3 
Trust Change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 
# Changing 195 118 72 39 33 11 7 4 0 2 1799 
% of Total 10.8 6.6 4 2.2 1.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 100 
Cum.% of Tot. 84.1 90.7 94.7 96.8 98.7 99.3 99.7 99.9 99.9 100 100 
Table 4. Event-Level Absolute Trust Change after a News Brief by Change Amount 
Change Amount 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 
Frequency 7589 3272 1467 806 493 414 147 80 57 19 48 14392 
Percent 52.7% 22.7% 10.2% 5.6% 3.4% 2.9% 1.0% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 0.3% 100 
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As shown in Table 4, the first dependent variable, magnitude of trust change, was not normally 
distributed.  We used robust standard errors for all statistical tests, which overcomes nonnormality 
problems for large samples (Snijders and Bosker 1999). The multilevel model was estimated using the full 
maximum likelihood algorithm in HLM (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). The other dependent variable 
(frequency of trust change) is a binary variable: whether trust changes after an event or not. We use a 
logistic multilevel (Bernoulli) model for trust change frequency. To reduce statistical estimate bias and 
increase efficiency, we use a Laplace transformation in the estimation method (Raudenbush and Bryk, 
2002). We used HLM 7.01 to analyze the data (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). To reduce the possibility of 
multicollinearity, we performed group mean centering on all predictors before conducting the analyses 
(Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Hoffmann and Gavin, 1998). Prior IS research used this approach (e.g. 
Kang, et al, 2012). All correlations among pairs of independent variables were less than 0.70, with 
sensemaking/threshold correlated the highest at 0.69. The next highest pair was only correlated at 0.51. 
This indicates the chances for multicollinearity are low. Below is the Table 5 Model 6 HLM model, where 
the dependent variable is the absolute value of trust change. HLM models 1-2 and 4-5 have either 
different dependent variables or subsets of these variables.  
Level-1 Model: Absolute_Trust_Changeij = β0j + β1j(D_Event1ij) + β2j(D_Event2ij) + β3j(D_Event4ij) + β4j(D_Event5ij) 
+ β5j(D_Event6ij) + β6j(D_Event7ij) + β7j(D_Event8ij) +β8j(Relevanceij) + β9j(Attentionij) + β10j(Attributionij)+ 
β11j(Thresholdij) + rij  
Level-2 Model: β0j = γ00 + γ01(D_Sirij) + γ02(D_Googlej) + γ03(D_TomTomj) + γ04(D_Facebookj) + γ05(D_PatterN2j) 
+ γ06(D_PatterN3j) + γ07(D_PatterN4j) + γ08(D_PatterN5j) + γ09(D_PatterN6j) + γ010(D_PatterN7j) + 
γ011(D_PatterN8j) + γ012(D_Malej) + γ013(Agej) + γ014(Disposition_To_Trustj) + γ015(Situational_Normalityj) + 
γ016(Cognitive_Rigidityj) + γ017(Structural_Assurancej) + γ018(Risk_Propensityj) + γ019(Trust_in_Mediaj) + 
γ020(Loyaltyj) + γ021(Technology_Experiencej) + γ022(Technology_Reputationj) + γ023(Technology_Riskj) + u0j 
Hypotheses 1-3 posit that attention, sensemaking, and judgment affect the frequency and magnitude of 
trust change. Process studies often employ magnitude and frequency of change (Monge 1990). Magnitude 
means the size of the change in trust level after an event. Frequency means whether the trust level 
changes or not after an event: 1 means trust changed, 0 means it did not. Using HLM, we test to see if 
attention/sensemaking/threshold are related to magnitude and frequency of trust changes. We test the 
model with these three cognitive gears (for H1-3) and the H4 and H5 risk and loyalty constructs. Then, to 
be sure our results are robust, we add respondent-level demographic control variables:  age, gender, and 
length of experience with the technology.  We also include other control variables that past studies suggest 
either relate to trust or to attitude change in a context like ours:  disposition to trust and two institution-
based trust variables—situational normality and structural assurance (McKnight et al. 2002a), risk 
propensity, trust in the media, cognitive rigidity (Polites and Karahanna 2012), perceived relevance of the 
news brief to trust, and technology reputation. Note that some dummy (D_) variables representing the 
technology or the pattern of news brief delivery are also significant. 
Frequency of Trust Change Tests  
Model 1 of Table 5 test sets up the dummy variables as a baseline. It includes controls for the experimental 
features, with dummy variables for the technology assigned (reference group Ford SYNC), the pattern by 
which the news briefs were delivered (D_Pattern2-8), and the news brief number (D_Event1-8). Event 3, 
a slightly positive event, was used as the event reference group. Model 2 adds the cognitive gears—
attention, attribution, and threshold—and loyalty and technology risk. In Model 2, all three cognitive 
gears positively influence trust change, with p-values <.001. This supports Hypotheses 1-3 for trust 
change frequency.  Model 2 also supports H4’s risk variable but not H5’s loyalty variable. When the control 
variables are added, Model 3 shows the result. Attention, sensemaking, and threshold are still p<.001 
significant, supporting the robustness of H1-3 results. Loyalty stays nonsignificant and tech risk is only 
significant at p<.10. Other significant variables are relevance, gender, trust in media, and technology 
experience. The minus sign on the gender dummy variable means females changed trust more often than 
males. And the greater the experience, the less trust changed.  
Magnitude of Trust Change Tests  
The right side of Table 5 shows the magnitude results. Supporting H1-3, Model 5 shows attention (p<.01), 
sensemaking (p<.001), and threshold (p<.001) are significant.  It also shows that risk increases trust 
 A Cognitive Process Model of Trust Change  
 Thirty Fifth International Conference on Information Systems, Auckland 2014 11 
change while loyalty decreases it (both p<.05), supporting H4 and H5. Model 6 shows that H1-3 are still 
supported when the controls are included. Support continues for risk (H4; p<.01) and loyalty (H5; p<.10) 
and. Also, the following controls are significant: relevance, gender, trust in media, and risk propensity. 
R2s could not be calculated for trust change frequency, but the deviance scores indicate improving model 
fit from Model 1 to Model 3. Given the difficulty of predicting trust change, our magnitude of trust change 
R2s seem acceptable. Overall, the trust-related model hypotheses are supported in nine out of ten tests 
that controlled for plausible alternatives (Models 3, 6).  
 
Table 5.  Hypothesis Testing Results 
 Frequency of Trust Change [beta, (t-value)] Magnitude of Trust Change [beta, (t-value)] 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept -0.03(-0.31) -0.03(-0.33) 0.08(0.77) 1.06(12.62)*** 1.03(13.35)*** 1.23(14.25)*** 
 Level 2  
D_Siri -0.64(-7.02)*** -0.43(-4.89)*** -0.39(-4.34)*** -0.35(-5.57)*** -0.13(-2.23)** -0.12(-2.13)* 
D_Google -0.26(-3.05)** -0.11(-1.28) -0.04(-0.46) -0.22(-3.57)*** -0.02(-0.43) 0.08(1.33) 
D_TomTom 0.22(2.65)** 0.33(4.00)*** 0.40(4.74)*** 0.53(6.93)*** 0.59(8.24)*** 0.66(9.14)*** 
D_Facebook -0.44(-5.06)*** -0.09(-1.09) 0.24(1.73)+ -0.25(-4.09)*** 0.05(0.87) 0.20(2.09)* 
D_PatterN2 -0.03(-0.33) -0.01(-0.17) -0.01(-0.06) -0.07(-0.69) -0.04(-0.48) -0.03(-0.34) 
D_PatterN3 0.05(0.48) 0.00(0.00) 0.01(0.14) -0.13(-1.50) -0.17(-1.99)* -0.16(-1.94)+ 
D_PatterN4 -0.14(-1.24) -0.13(-1.22) -0.15(-1.38) -0.23(-2.59)* -0.22(-2.64)** -0.22(-2.68)** 
D_PatterN5 -0.14(-1.28) -0.20(-1.93)+ -0.18(-1.75)+ -0.25(-2.87)** -0.30(-3.66)*** -0.29(-3.55)*** 
D_PatterN6 -0.20(-1.87)+ -0.21(-2.01)* -0.20(-1.92)+ -0.31(-3.45)*** -0.30(-3.65)*** -0.30(-3.60)*** 
D_PatterN7 -0.06(-0.56) -0.10(-0.98) -0.08(-0.78) -0.25(-2.84)** -0.28(-3.51)*** -0.28(-3.44)*** 
D_PatterN8 -0.08(-0.71) -0.12(-1.13) -0.10(-1.00) -0.21(-2.34)* -0.24(-2.89)** -0.24(-2.80)** 
Loyalty  0.01(0.67) 0.00(0.02)  -0.02(-2.32)* -0.03(-2.80)** 
Tech Risk  0.05(2.81)** 0.03(1.87)+  0.02(2.06)* 0.02(1.76)+ 
Gender   -0.14(-2.54)**   -0.10(-2.45)* 
Age   -0.01(-1.23)   0.01(0.71) 
Disp To Trust   0.03(1.64)   0.02(1.37) 
Situ. Norm.   -0.01(-0.90)   0.01(0.61) 
Cogn. 
Rigidity   -0.02(-1.34)  
 
-0.01(-0.51) 
Str. Assur.   0.00(0.04)   0.01(0.69) 
Risk Propens   0.01(0.95)   0.02(1.90)+ 
Trust Media   0.06(3.27)***   0.02(1.88)+ 
Tech Experi.   -0.04(-1.93)+   0.01(0.43) 
Tech Reputa.   -0.02(-0.83)   -0.01(-0.56) 
Level 1 (Event)  
D_Event1 0.47(7.67)*** 0.38(5.88)*** 0.26(3.62)*** 0.33(7.74)*** 0.25(5.71)*** 0.08(1.62) 
D_Event2 0.18(2.99)** 0.15(2.45)* 0.10(1.62) 0.10(2.61)** 0.08(1.98)* 0.01(0.14) 
D_Event4 0.40(6.69)*** 0.18(2.83)** -0.01(-0.06) 0.50(10.83)*** 0.32(7.16)*** 0.04(0.89) 
D_Event5 0.26(4.40)*** 0.10(1.68)+ -0.09(-1.16) 0.37(8.11)*** 0.24(5.53)*** -0.04(-0.84) 
D_Event6 0.19(3.16)** -0.01(-0.23) -0.19(-2.51)* 0.20(4.80)*** 0.05(1.24) -0.20(-4.00)*** 
D_Event7 -0.09(-1.57) -0.21(-3.29)*** -0.34(-4.70)*** -0.02(-0.67) -0.09(-2.59)** -0.27(-6.20)*** 
D_Event8 0.35(5.70)*** 0.01(0.29) -0.20(-2.36)* 0.35(7.63)*** 0.09(2.16)* -0.23(-3.69)*** 
Attention  0.08(3.63)*** 0.07(3.41)***  0.04(2.75)** 0.03(2.26)* 
Attribution  0.23(8.79)*** 0.22(8.32)***  0.19(8.38)*** 0.17(7.74)*** 
Threshold  0.27(9.84)*** 0.27(9.64)***  0.20(8.06)*** 0.19(7.85)*** 
Relevance   0.14(3.84)***   0.20(7.48)*** 
Level 1 R2 na na na 0.018 0.054 0.059 
Level 2 R2 na na na 0.158 0.302 0.301 
Deviance 43129 42458 42413 51034 50364 50361 
+ p<0.1; ∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01 ; ∗∗∗ p<0.001. 
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Behavioral Intention to Use (BI) Change Tests 
We found that behavioral intention to use (BI) change magnitude correlates with trust change magnitude 
at 0.63. BI and trust change frequency correlate at 0.44.  We ran a complete set of analyses, parallel to 
those reported in Table 5, with BI as the dependent variable.  To save space, we do not report the full 
results here, but the results are fairly similar whether we model trust change or behavioral intention to 
use change. In both cases, attention, attribution, and threshold are significant (p<.001) predictors. 
However, two differences exist. First, for Models 5 and 6 loyalty is a significant predictor of trust change 
magnitude, but not for BI change magnitude. Second, while for trust change, tech risk is only slightly 
significant (p<.10) in Models 3 and 6, for BI change, tech risk is more significant (p<.001 for frequency 
and p<.01 for magnitude). Thus, it appears tech risk is more crucial to BI than to trust, whereas loyalty is 
more important to trust than to BI. This displays an interesting distinction between trust and behavioral 
intention to use a technology. 
Discussion  
This paper applies a new lens—process theory—to trust progression. It proposes that three cognitive 
processes are inherently involved in trust change:  attention, sensemaking, and meeting a threshold. Our 
model builds on the trust literature, in that a number of trust scholars have suggested that attention, 
attribution, and threshold are involved in trust (e.g., Luhmann, 1979; Rempel et al. 1985; Wang and 
Benbasat 2008).  However, we know of no study that has proposed that, and tested the extent to which, 
these three mechanisms affect trust change. Some scholars have proposed or found different processes by 
which trust grows or changes (e.g., Doney and Cannon 1997; Komiak and Benbasat, 2008; Stewart 2003). 
But no one has proposed and examined the way three distinct cognitive mechanisms operate to influence 
trust change. While many have examined the factors that lead to trust, this paper delves into the more 
specific level of three cognitive mechanisms that operate to enable trust change to occur.  
This research provides several intriguing insights into how trust change happens.  First, we find it is hard 
to predict if, and how much, trust will change. This indicates that trust change should be viewed as a 
probabilistic, indeterminate occurrence. This seems consistent with our modeling these mechanisms as 
necessary but not sufficient. In contrast, by positing trust antecedents in variance theory form, most trust 
research has suggested that sufficient factors can be proposed to change trust.   
Second, we find that all three of the cognitive mechanisms affect trust change, both in terms of frequency 
and magnitude of change.  We also ran another model for both magnitude and frequency that included 2-
way and 3-way interactions among attention, sensemaking, and threshold. For magnitude, each of these 
interactions was significant (p<.01 or p<.05), and the significance of the main effects remained. This 
finding provides initial support for the way our Figure 2 model proposes that these gears work together to 
change trust magnitude. However, for frequency, while the main effects stayed significant at p<.001, none 
of the interactions was significant. This difference between frequency and magnitude needs further study. 
Third, the results from H4 and H5 indicate perceived technology risk and vendor loyalty are respondent-
level factors that may affect trust change. Risk increased both magnitude and frequency of trust change. 
Perhaps risk reduces one’s comfort level behind one’s trust, making it more volatile. Loyalty to the 
technology vendor decreased trust change magnitude but not frequency. Thus, loyalty helped respondents 
decrease the size of the trust changes vis-a-vis respondents who were not loyal. Vendor loyalty probably 
made one feel more confident in one’s current level of trust in the technology, reducing the felt need to 
change. 
Fourth, we find that certain respondent-level constructs affect trust change while many do not. 
Disposition to trust, cognitive rigidity, technology reputation, situational normality, and structural 
assurance did not affect trust change. Experience with the technology decreased the frequency of trust 
change, probably because experience allows less reliance on secondhand accounts. Trust in the media 
increased trust because it made the news briefs more credible. Relevance of the news brief made the news 
brief more applicable to trust questions, raising its influence.  Note that the antecedents of trust change 
frequency are not necessarily the same as those of trust change magnitude. This needs further study. 
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Fifth, the study results show that change in behavioral intention to use occurs for most of the same 
reasons as trust change occurs. The same three cognitive mechanisms are at work in a significant manner 
in BI change. However, loyalty does not affect BI change, and tech risk affects BI change more than it does 
trust change. These findings raise more questions than they answer, and certainly warrant additional 
study. 
Implications for Future Research  
Overall, the study shows that trust change can be understood in more depth at the level of the 
mechanisms behind trust. This is a watershed finding that should spur much more detailed study of trust 
change. Research can now concentrate—not on what factors lead to trust—but on what factors affect the 
cognitive mechanisms behind trust changes. This study also indicates ways to research trust stability. For 
example, the differences in trust change with- and without experience with the trustee should be 
researched. Research should examine what makes trust “sticky” or hard to change. This study raises the 
question of how much of trust stickiness is due to one having to go through the complex set of three 
cognitive mechanisms in order to change trust and how much is due to other factors, such as the amount 
of first-hand experience one has with the trustee. Our results indicate an overall decline in trust in spite of 
showing respondents four negative and four positive news briefs that were rated as equivalent in valence. 
Further, trust changed differentially among the five technologies (Table 2). These findings raise the 
question of whether the stronger effects of negative news are moderated by vendor loyalty or by some 
other factors. Our results are reported across technologies, which raises the question of how the model 
works within a given technology. One major difference between Facebook and the other technologies 
studied is that respondents had far more experience with Facebook. How this difference plays out in the 
model needs to be studied. 
Study Limitations 
Due to respondent time constraints, we were limited to the use of one item per construct. To ensure 
construct validity, we analyzed a round of pilot data in which we measured each construct with three 
items and found the constructs passed validity tests. However, this is still a main study limitation. 
Another limitation is that we studied only depth of attention after delivering the news brief, instead of 
examining if the respondent would notice the news brief at all given other stimuli commonly experienced. 
A third limitation is that we studied eight events delivered in a very short timeframe. It is also important 
to examine the effects of the trust change mechanisms over longer periods of elapsed time. Fourth, we 
studied only the effects of second-hand news on trust change. Direct use of the technology will likely 
produce different effects on trust change. Finally, our respondents were university students, limiting 
generalizability. Yet students are a key group for understanding new technology use. 
Conclusion 
Our results show for the first time the effects on trust change of three necessary but not sufficient 
cognitive processes—attention, attribution, and threshold. This study also opens new avenues for IS trust 
research. It shows that one can unpack the black box that is trust change to examine the mental 
mechanisms that it involves. By so doing, one can study the trust change phenomenon at a new and 
crucial level of analysis.  Trust is a critical determinant of system usage, and end users are constantly 
confronted with news about hackers, security threats, product failures, and technology risks.  By 
providing a model of how these events may change trust in technology, our study begins to fill an 
important gap in information systems theory and practice. 
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